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Incentives and Teacher Effort: Further Evidence from a Developing Country

  • 31/03/2022
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Giới thiệu

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of how much students learn in school, and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of lively policy debate in both rich and poor countries. This paper examines how teacher incentives, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from lao pdr, we estimate measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring outside of class hours, which are not the typical measures used in previous research. Estimation results fit well under the standard labour supply framework and indicate that greater teacher effort is associated with non-pecuniary incentives such as more teacher autonomy over teaching materials and monitoring as measured by the existence of an active parentteacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous ols-probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision. 2016 The world bank economics of transition 2016 the european bank for reconstruction and development published by blackwell publishing ltd

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